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What makes a ‘good’ EU Presidency? A comparison between the two most recent Italian and Irish experiences in office can be instrumental in evaluating the crucial factors that affect presidency performance. The argument is developed in three main stages. Firstly, four key roles are selected in order to benchmark presidencies. Secondly, these roles are applied to the empirical record as criteria to devise a score-card of the two presidencies under consideration. Thirdly, the factors that affect the performance of the presidency are elicited, and are related to two mainstream theoretical approaches deployed in the study of the EU. It is argued here that socially constructed elements, such as expertise in EU affairs, political credibility, and attitudes towards European integration, have more explanatory leverage than purely power-based factors, such as country size, economic and political weight.






The existing literature on the Presidency of the European Union (EU), or to be more precise, the Presidency of the Council of Ministers and the European Council, consists of either institutional studies (Edwards and Wallace 1977, Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997, Hayes-Renshaw 2002, Kirchner 1992 Sherrington 2000, Wallace 1985, Westlake 2000), or empirical accounts of specific presidencies, often written by practitioners.​[1]​ An exception is the volume edited by Elgstrom (2003a), which is theoretically-oriented and offers a comparative perspective on EU presidencies, with several chapters on individual cases. This book, however, refrains from comparing specific presidencies, leaving a blind spot in the EU literature.​[2]​

This article compares the Italian and Irish presidencies held respectively in the second half of 2003 and the first half of 2004, and addresses two crucial questions: what makes a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ presidency, and which factors affect its performance? In particular, what presidency-specific elements come into play? The structured comparison of these two presidencies has theoretical and empirical purposes. Theoretically, it provides the testing ground for two scholarly paradigms in political science, namely, constructivism and rationalism, which highlight two different sets of elements affecting performance. Empirically, this study devises an analytically informed scorecard of the Italian and Irish presidencies, which underpins the comparison. Methodologically, these presidencies have been selected for two main reasons. First, since Italy and Ireland held consecutive presidencies, they dealt with the same ‘core’ EU dossiers, principally the Inter Governmental Conference (IGC) and the negotiations on the Constitution for Europe, and this enhances the value of the comparison between the two terms of office. Secondly, Italy and Ireland being large and small respectively, the findings of this study feed into the topical debate around the evolving divide between large and small countries in the EU. 





The functions of the Presidency of the EU do not need to be reviewed here (cf De Schoutheete 2002, Edwards and Wallace 1977, Elgstrom 2003b, Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997, Kirchner 1992, Sherrington 2000, Wallace 1985, Westlake 2000). Since four key roles are intrinsic to each presidency, they can be used as criteria to evaluate the performance of each. These are:
i) business manager, organising, coordinating and chairing all the councils, working groups and other EU meetings, including IGC sessions; 
 ii) mediator, furthering consensus in negotiations and brokering agreements, especially during IGCs, tabling compromises, often on the basis of trades offs or issue-linkages, seeking to accommodate sensitive interests of all the parties involved;
iii) political leader, promoting political initiatives and specific priorities, with a view to furthering the process of European integration, or promoting a better functioning of the Union; 
iv) internal and external representative, acting as a liaison point between the Council and other EU institutions, as well as vis–a-vis the outside world.

Given that the functions of the Presidency have undergone significant transformations over time, these roles need to be qualified in the light of recent developments. The most obvious observation is the increased complexity of EU negotiations and policy-making more generally, with twenty-five delegations involved in the 2003-4 IGC. The functions of business manager and mediator have therefore become more important. On the other hand, the effort to manage such intricacies has led to a progressive change in the nature of the Presidency, whereby the scope for ‘new political initiatives’ and ‘presidency priorities’ is greatly diminished – in this respect, the political function of the president-in-office has been curtailed.​[3]​ In the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the establishment of the high representative has diminished the role of the Presidency as external representative of the Union. Furthermore, the new complexity of the enlarged Union has made more multifaceted the task of external representation. 

According to the academic literature on the Presidency, this office is assumed to be carried out impartially, efficiently and effectively (cf Elgstrom 2003c, Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1998, Kirchner 1992, Wallace 1985). It should be noted that these rules of engagement may at times conflict with each other, as indicated by the different emphasis placed on them by various authors. 

Once the criteria to evaluate presidencies have been established, it is important to review the factors that can affect their performance, distinguishing between presidency-specific factors, which are the focus of this research, and structural and contingent elements beyond the influence of the presidency, but which however affect its tenure in office. For example, such elements could include the prevailing economic and political context, the entrenched positions of countries in EU negotiations, and unforeseen crises. However, the way in which these contingencies are dealt with can make a difference, and is an indicator of the calibre of the presidency  

III. Internal Organisation and Priorities of Each Presidency 

In line with the Italian style of dealing with EU policy (see Della Cannanea 2000a, 2000b), the internal organisation of the presidency relied on an informal system of coordination that was set in place before and during the presidency, rather than creating a formal coordinating unit amongst the various ministries.  As in previous Italian presidencies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the fulcrum of activities of the IGC in 2003. A comparatively small group of personnel within the Foreign Ministry, mainly from Directorate General (DG) European Integration and DG Europe, carried the workload for the management of the IGC. Traditionally, the Foreign Ministry and the Italian Permanent Representation in Brussels tend to retain an elite of European specialists both within their own ranks and other departments and this socialisation process has worked to the benefit of the Foreign Ministry (Hine 1992). This ministry, contrary to the larger part of the Italian public administration, is a well-established institution, with a sense of collective purpose and esprit de corps. The diplomatic input was greater in the day-to-day management of the IGC, whereas the political authorities were in the spotlight during the Council meetings, as well as the external representation of the EU. The different degree of engagement of civil servants and political leadership in the various activities of the Presidency affected its performance.

The organisation of the Irish presidency followed a pattern that had been successfully evolving for over a quarter of a century.  The lead was taken by the Department of Foreign Affairs working closely with the Office of the Taoiseach and the Permanent Representation in Brussels. The latter has become increasingly important in guiding the Government during a Presidency. The Representation under Anne Anderson was virtually doubled in size for the Presidency and is divided into functional departments that mirror cognate ministries in Dublin, as well as key policy areas in the Commission. The task of the Irish Representation during a Presidency is to maintain close relations with the Commission but especially with other Member States, so that compromise solutions to impending crises can be devised well before they become publicly controversial.  

Generally, the most successful presidencies forge good contacts with officials in the Commission, the European Parliament (EP) and, in particular, the Council Secretariat  (Hayes Renshaw and Wallace 1997). This is more common for small member states that, with their smaller bureaucracies, have fewer human resources to put at the disposal of the presidency.Indeed, this was more the case for the Irish presidency, than the Italian one, and worked to the benefit of the former.

The programme presented by the Italian government when it took over the Presidency in July 2003 highlighted five ‘priority objectives’:​[4]​ the completion of negotiations at the IGC on the Constitution of Europe; the promotion of economic growth in Europe; the move towards an enlarged Europe, making the EU ‘a strong, authoritative figure at international level’, ‘speaking with one voice and intervening in the main crisis areas in a spirit of open and fruitful cooperation with the United States’; the fight against international terrorism, establishing effective measures to combat transnational crime and illegal immigration.

The principal themes for the Irish Presidency were: a successful enlargement; working together for growth (embracing the Lisbon strategy, competitiveness, employment and social inclusion); strengthening freedom, justice and security, and finally, the EU and third world.​[5]​ Many of these issues were of course inherited from the previous Presidency and were well advanced. By far the most important issue facing the Irish Presidency was a resolution of the dispute that had created deadlock in the IGC in the final weeks of the Italian Presidency. This topic was mentioned first in the Irish Presidency’s agenda, but it was worded carefully so as not to raise any undue expectations. Ireland committed itself only to do ‘all within its powers to advance the work of the IGC’ by consulting with its partners, reporting back, ‘at which point it may be possible to chart a way forward’ (p. 5).    

However skilful a Presidency may be in managing its role, it has little control over the domestic context in which it operates. Domestically, the ‘dog that did not bark’ during the Italian Presidency was the breaking out of major disagreements on ‘Europe’ within the Italian government. A substantial potential for conflict on core issues in the Constitution for Europe was present within the centre right coalition, given the cohabitation of the old Christian Democratic tradition, strongly pro-EU, the National Alliance, recently converted to Europe, and the unstable and populist Northern League, which has recently embraced Eurosceptic rhetoric (Quaglia 2003). Relations with the US, and the involvement in Iraq were also a bone of contention within the government. However, intra-coalition disagreements were put on hold because the EU presidency was perceived as an important test for the centre-right government. The civil servants primarily involved in the activities of the IGC were also skilful in bringing (and keeping) together the different views within the government, even though, at times, this caused inconsistency in conducting the IGC negotiations, for example, on judicial cooperation. 

The Irish presidency by contrast was less fragmented and more consistent in its approach, and this can largely be ascribed to differences in the domestic political context. Although the Irish Government’s handling of the of the Presidency might in theory have been adversely affected by the existence of a coalition government, there were no serious disagreements. This is in the tradition of coalition governments in Ireland which are normally very stable, due partly to the respective sizes of the coalition partners (usually a big party and a small party in tandem, Fianna Fail, Progressive Democrats in 2004) but also to the ideological homogeneity of the Irish party system, which is unusual in its lack of dispersion across the right-left continuum (Coakley and Gallagher 1999). The ideological convergence is particularly noticeable with regard to EU membership where it can be said that all significant political parties are now sufficiently ‘Europeanised’ to compete with each other only on details, not on principles. The only exception was policy towards the USA where other considerations (eg Iraq, neutrality etc) came into play.   Overall, therefore, the Irish Government was able to project an image of exceptional consensus. 

IV. The IGC and the Constitution for Europe

The Intergovernmental Conference that convened in 2003 differed from previous EU IGCs in that it had been preceded by a Convention (​http:​/​​/​european-convention.eu.int​/​" \t "_blank​) on the Future of Europe, which submitted its recommendations in the form of a new draft Constitutional Treaty (​http:​/​​/​european-convention.eu.int​/​docs​/​Treaty​/​cv00850.en03.pdf" \t "_blank​),​[6]​ and was considered a good basis for starting the IGC.​[7]​ The ten accession states participated fully in the work of the IGC, whereas the three candidate countries - Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey - participated as observers. 

The main stumbling block of the IGC under the Italian presidency and one which persisted into the Irish presidency were the negotiations on the EU institutional framework, which can broadly be subsumed under five headings: i) voting weights in the Council and voting rules, that is, the use of Qualified Majority Voting; ii) the size and composition of the Commission; iii) the creation of a President of the European Council and the status of the EU Foreign Minister; iv) the Council voting rules; and v) revision clauses. In terms of policy areas, issues concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Security and Defence Policy, and judicial cooperation were also controversial. Despite the fact that during the Italian Presidency agreement was eventually reached on about eighty ‘focal points’, the final European Council on 12-13 December 2003 failed to reach agreement on a new EU voting system, with Germany and France, on one side, and Spain and Poland on the other. An overall agreement on the Constitutional Treaty was eventually achieved at the end of the six months of the Irish tenure in office.

The negotiations on the constitution for Europe were complex and were affected by many structural factors, beyond the control of either presidency. The negotiating positions of twenty-five member states with very different preferences on core issues were complicated by the presence of several controversial points that had either not been settled in previous negotiations, such as the reform of the EU institutional framework, or had been inherited from previous IGCs, such as the voting system agreed in the Nice Treaty. There were also time-constraints, for the IGC under the Italian presidency lasted less than three months, which would have been an unusually short period to conclude an IGC. 

These factors limited the room for manoeuvre of the Italian Presidency and ultimately determined the negative outcome of the IGC in December 2003 – a failure that, in all probability, would have happened under any presidency.​[8]​ Similarly, a major change in structural factors outside the influence of the presidency broke the deadlock and made it possible to further agreement on the Constitution under the Irish presidency. The terrorist attack of the 11 March and the change of government and foreign policy outlook in Spain, the weakened position of Poland, left isolated and with an outgoing prime minister, the approaching of the potentially divisive EU budgetary negotiations, as well as more conciliatory stances by the German and French governments, all contributed to the success of the second round of the IGC. It can be argued that the German and French governments, and, to a lesser extent, Spain and Poland, influenced the IGC, and can be seen as key players. However, the way in which Italy and Ireland played the role of business manager and mediator affected the outcome, and is essential in evaluating good and bad presidencies. 

The working method chosen by the Italian Presidency was not to open negotiation on the entire text drafted by the Convention, but instead, taking stock of the work done, to discuss only the points left open. A tight timetable was set in order to reach an overall agreement by December 2003, with the aim of signing the Treaty before the EP elections in May 2004.  However, whenever the Presidency perceived that there was a real problem for member states with the existing text, and also taking into account national sensibilities, the issue became a ‘focal point’ for discussion in the IGC. For example, following the disagreement expressed by some of the smaller member states, the Presidency decided to open the IGC negotiations on the composition of the Commission. On a limited number of issues, such as the power of the EP on the EU budget, the voting system on matters related to judicial cooperation, the Presidency’s assessment was that the Convention had gone too far for its proposals to be accepted by the member states and it therefore undertook an action of ‘containment’, promoting a revision of the relevant articles in the draft treaty. 

For most of the IGC, its activities were relatively well orchestrated by the officials of the Italian Presidency, which had a strategic framework that informed its actions during the negotiations.  Although on several points the positions of the Italian government were close to those of France and Germany, it would be unfair to say that Italy provided a biased chairmanship. During the IGC, the Presidency tabled several compromises and tried to make a strategic use – at times over-use - of ‘rendezvous’ clauses, which would delay the coming into force of certain agreed provisions, or would postpone agreement on certain issues. On the negative side, the performance of the Presidency in the IGC was adversely affected, especially in the final stage, by the over-confident style of the Prime Minister, the emphasis placed on his business-manager negotiating skills, and personal ability to broker a deal.​[9]​ The Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, was widely perceived as not having a sufficient understanding of, and expertise in, EU affairs, diplomatic skills and personal credibility to broker a deal in difficult negotiations (Di Quirico 2003). Furthermore, several European governments held Prime Minister Berlusconi in rather low esteem, an opinion that some leaders had made public when he won the elections in May 2001, and an attitude that did not improve over time.

The six-month period of the Irish Presidency saw a transition in the fortunes of the IGC from stalemate to outright success. The agreement hammered out at the Brussels Summit in June, was the result of several working methods that are key to an understanding of any successful Presidency. Firstly, the Irish dampened down expectations at the outset. This had the effect of maximising the impact of any progress that was achieved, as well as limiting the damage following any failure to make progress. The ability of Prime Minister, Bertie Ahern, to steer a middle path between existing vested interest among twenty-five member states increased the goodwill of the other participants in the IGC. Instead of pretending that he had no interests in the outcome he made it clear where Ireland stood, but also showed how his country, like everyone else’s, would need to make concessions. The use of bilateral meetings (Ahern travelled widely during his Presidency) made optimal use of the “confessional” approach. On the whole, the Irish Presidency managed its business well: there were no reports of deadlines being missed, or confusion being caused by mistakes over arrangements for meetings, over protocol, or over the composition of agendas. 

For prestige reasons, the Italian government had been keen to have the historic document agreed under its presidency in record time. However, as the Italian representatives later recognised, the risk of such an approach, in an attempt to reach consensus, was that EU leaders would end up cobbling together a compromise that would make the functioning of the expanded EU more difficult. The Irish presidency, instead, underplayed this theme and adopted a softly-softly approach to the IGC negotiations. ‘Ireland’s quiet diplomacy’ (Irish Times 27 March 2004), contrasted neatly with the bombastic style of the Italian president-in-office.

V. The External Relations of the EU

In the external relations of the EU, the role of the presidency as the collective representative varies according to policy areas (Bengtsson 2003). Since in the CFSP the position of the presidency is more prominent, this policy provides a suitable testing ground to evaluate performance. The CFSP offers a prominent platform for those member states that are not major foreign policy actors in their own right, which is always the case for smaller member states, such as Ireland, but also for some of the larger ones, such as Italy, whose foreign policy tends to be rather low key. 

The external actors with whom Italy and Ireland had the most significant contacts during their presidency were Russia and the US respectively. For the Berlusconi government, relations with the US were also very important, but they only marginally engaged the Italian Presidency in its role as external representative of the EU. During the second semester of 2003 EU relations with Russia provides a vantage point from which to assess the performance of the Italian presidency, whose views on this issue diverged from the rest of the EU. During the Russia-EU meeting in Rome on 7 November 2003, Berlusconi, in his role as president of the EU, contradicted agreed EU policy and months of preparation by the Commission which had been trying to put pressure on the Russian President Vladimir Putin regarding the respect of human rights in Russia. By playing down differences on the Kyoto protocol and defending Putin’s behaviour in Chechnya, the Italian Presidency broke with the EU's established policy of making improved human rights a condition for developing relations with Russia. This provoked diplomatic disappointment in EU capitals and resulted in public disagreement with the EU Commission (Financial Times, 7 November 2003), even though it should be noted that relations with Russia have traditionally been a thorny issue within the EU - they are particularly sensitive for the new member states - and Russian leadership has been very skilful in exploiting disagreements within the EU. 

By contrast, the most delicate external relations role performed by the Irish Presidency was that with the US. This relationship was potentially very divisive: it divided public opinion in Ireland; it divided governments in the EU; it might have inflamed relations between the EU and the US and it might have disrupted the relationship between Ireland and the US. Within Ireland, public disquiet regarding relations with the US stemmed from a number of concerns, such as the war and the treatment of prisoners in Iraq, the use of Shannon by US military aircraft, and environmental opposition to the US policy on Kyoto. In the EU, there was the division between ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe on the war in Iraq, which was exacerbated by the revelations of torture perpetrated by US soldiers. Furthermore, in representing the EU’s view on these controversial issues - on many of which no clear EU view could be discerned - the Irish Presidency was forced also to consider its bilateral relationship with the United States, together with the degree of polarisation within Irish public opinion.  

The Irish Presidency, being forced to walk a tightrope between a number of conflicting interests, adopted two distinct postures. On the one hand, it argued to the Irish public that the EU-US relationship was different from the Irish-US relationship and, in particular, that the visit of President Bush to Ireland - a visit which in many ways crystallised the dilemmas facing the Presidency - was an EU matter and was only taking place because Ireland was holding the Presidency of the EU. The unwritten text here was that this was a ‘duty’ that Ireland was performing as part of its Presidency.  On the other hand, it was argued that because the Irish economy depends so much on US trade and investment, and because of the personal links between Irish and American people, it would be counterproductive to cancel the visit or to show hostility to the visitor. 

The general conclusion was that the EU-US Summit that took place in June 2004 had been handled adroitly. Despite unprecedented security measures and some straight talking by both politicians and the media before and during the Summit, the proposed agreements on AIDS, on satellite navigation systems, and on trade, were duly signed. There were several reasons why the Irish Presidency could be credited with the success of this transatlantic summit: at a bilateral level, Ireland could not afford to offend the USA for the reasons mentioned above. At the same time, Ireland’s own reaction to the invasion of Iraq placed the country in a ‘balanced’ position, as Ireland had not sent troops to Iraq, yet it facilitated the airlift of thousands of US troops to the region by providing refuelling facilities at Shannon Airport.

In performing the task of external representation of the EU, both presidencies had to cope with the lack of a clear EU position, and the difficulties of reconciling different foreign policy outlooks amongst the member states. In turn, in managing the external relations of the EU vis-à-vis Russia and the US, both presidencies were influenced by the foreign policy orientation of their respective government in office. The Italian task was complicated by the idiosyncratic foreign policy views of the Prime Minister, who had invested much personal prestige in his relations with the Russian leader, and who had also been on the record supporting EU membership for Russia and Israel  (Financial Times, 7 November 2003). By contrast, the Irish Prime Minister was able to capitalise on well-entrenched habits of cooperation in several fields, not the least of which had been the close involvement of US administrations in the Northern Ireland peace process. ​[10]​

VI. Relations with other EU Institutions and Member States

Within the EU, the presidency is expected to be the liaison point for EU institutions and national governments and other political authorities. It is therefore important to evaluate concisely how this function was carried out by Italy and Ireland. 

The relationship between the Italian Presidency and the European Parliament began disastrously when, during the stormy session in which the Italian government presented its programme before the EP, the Italian Prime Minister likened a German MEP to a ‘nazi chief’. During the IGC, the ECOFIN attempt, under the chairmanship of Italian Treasury Minister Tremonti, and supported by representatives of other member states, to curb the power of the EP on the EU budget was not welcome by the MEPs. At the highest political level, the interaction between the Presidency and the Commission was tense. The Commission criticized the Italian Presidency for its management of the external relations of the EU, and for the lack of support given to the Commission in enforcing the Stability and Growth Pact. The Italian Government, in turn, did not mince its words on the conduct of the Commission. 

Relations between Italy and the main member states were also problematic. After Berlusconi’s gaffe with the senior German Social Democrat MEP, relations with the German government were further strained by some unwise statements by a Northern League minister. The relations between Berlusconi and French President Jaques Chirac had never been good, and those with Britain had worsened over time. In an approach different from those of France and other European countries, the British Prime Minister put considerable effort in establishing good working relations with the new Italian government elected in 2001, stressing the interests they had in common, such as implementing a labour market reform in the EU. However, by 2003, the Anglo-Italian entente was at its lowest. It is very telling of the lukewarm relationship between Italy and the other main EU players the fact that, on such an important matter as defence and security policy, the Italian government, which also held the EU presidency, was systematically excluded from the discussions taking place between France, Germany and Britain.

The success of the Irish Presidency can be attributed to the good relations it enjoyed with other member states. These relationships were not always equally harmonious but Ireland’s small size as a country made it less difficult for it to be accused of having an aggressive agenda, and facilitated relations with the other small sized countries. Since the Irish government respected Germany and France’s quest in the IGC for a double majority principle to be endorsed in the Constitutional Treaty, the Presidency was well received by the Big Two. At the same time, the personal relationship between Blair and Ahern, had been forged over years of a common pursuit of solutions to various ‘crises’ in Northern Ireland. At the European Council in June 2004, when it appeared that a major fissure had opened up between Germany and France, on the one hand, and Britain on the other, the fact that the Irish Presidency could count on good relations with all three countries was an important contribution to achieving success at the summit. 

The appointment of a new president of the Commission proved to be a litmus test of the presidency’s diplomatic skills since the issue generated a surprising amount of heat, and good candidates were eliminated at the outset for reasons other than their ability. Ahern found himself in the enviable, but rather embarrassing, position of being canvassed for the job at exactly the time he was trying to fill it with someone else! In the end, quiet efficient networking behind the scenes by the Presidency found a compromise candidate in the person of the Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Durao Barroso who proved to be acceptable to a vast majority of the EU governments. The important implication here is that Ahern’s reputation as a disinterested negotiator was greatly enhanced during the search for the new President precisely because he was himself being seriously sought as a candidate for the post. This underlined the extent of his own accumulated political credit during the Presidency.      

VII. An Overall Comparative Assessment 

Whereas it would not be particularly helpful to speak of ‘presidency styles’, three main features emerge from the comparison between the Italian and Irish presidencies. First, the uneven performance of the Italian presidency across policy areas and policy locations, largely as consequence of the divide between the civil servants and political authorities, as well as the different views within the government, which contrasts with the consistency and stability of the Irish presidency. 

Second, the idiosyncratic Italian President, regarded as a controversial public figure both within and without Italy, was one of the principal causes of uneven performance in the activities of the Presidency. This became increasingly noticeable when the President-in-Office’s political input was greater, as was the case with the external relations of the EU, relations with other governments and during European Council meetings. The Irish Prime minister, by contrast, enjoyed a solid reputation in EU negotiating fora, which was consolidated by the satisfactory conclusion of the IGC. 

The third feature is a distinctive form of politicisation which took place under the Italian presidency, and which was due to the political rivalry between Prime Minister Berlusconi and the President of the Commission Romano Prodi. Indeed, they are likely to be competing for the office of prime minister at the next Italian general elections. This meant that the EU arena came to be regarded as an extension of the domestic political and electoral space, and domestic politics was ‘exported’ to the EU level.  The Irish presidency, on the contrary, was not subject to the same degree of politicisation of the office.

At first sight these findings seem to confirm the view that small countries tend to make better presidencies than large ones as suggested by some authors (Elgstrom 2003, Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997). Three main reasons are generally given for this: small countries have fewer interests to defend, hence they are likely to act as impartial mediators; the limited size of their civil service requires close collaboration with EU bodies, especially the General Secretariat; and the ability to negotiate seeking consensus, exploring possibilities for trade offs, rather than flexing their muscles. They are also less likely to undertake unilateral initiatives and tend to be more aware of the range of national sensitivities in conducting external relations on behalf of the EU. However, in this case, these explanations partly miss the point, in that what really made the difference between the Italian and Irish presidencies, and their performance, were the intangible factors that characterised each of them, and which acted as liabilities in the former case and assets in the latter. These factors included the external political credibility of the government holding office, the foreign policy orientations, especially but not exclusively towards European integration, and the knowledge and understanding of EU affairs, which stems partly from past experience and socialisation in EU processes.

The Italian government was widely perceived as softly Eurosceptic, or, at any rate, less proeuropean than its predecessors. It also seemed less willing and able to play the game according to the EU ‘rules’, not least because it was its first experience in holding the presidency. It was also less familiar with EU dynamics, as it was elected in June 2001, after a short-lived experience in 1994. The expectations in the other member states were very low, if not negative, when Italy started its semester, as indicated by the articles that appeared in many foreign newspapers and by the statements of foreign political leaders. Therefore, there was a credibility gap, which to some extent was confirmed by subsequent events. On the whole, the Italian government could not be accused of ‘flexing its muscle’, and acting as a partial chair, as large countries are more prone to do. Of course, there were exceptions, for example, in dealing with the Stability and Growth Pact, where the Italian government had a vested interest, being a potential non-compliant itself.​[11]​

The Irish presidency was a better presidency because it could rely on a range of intangible factors: first and foremost the positive perceptions and credibility enjoyed by its political leadership, which were already favourable, and actually improved during the six-month period. On the one hand, any last vestiges of Euroscepticism attributed to Irish public opinion as a result of the first Nice Referendum outcome (O’Brennan 2003), were banished during the Presidency, as confirmed by Eurobarometer data that showed that Irish public opinion was more supportive of EU membership than any other member state.​[12]​ In Italy, by contrast, Eurobarometer data indicate a decreasing support for European integration, in a country that has traditionally had a very high level of public support for the EU. The way in which the IGC, the EU-US summit, and the appointment of a new Commission President were handled tended to consolidate the reputation that Ireland had gained in previous Presidencies none of which could be said to have ‘failed’, or to have left the EU in a worse condition.        

The theoretical insights drawn from our comparison principally concern the weight to be assigned to various factors affecting the performance of the Presidency and which can be linked to the rationalist and constructivist paradigms (Elgstrom and Tallberg 2003).​[13]​ On the one hand, there are power-based geopolitical and economic factors, such as country size and political or economic weight. According to rationalist explanations, large member states holding the presidency, given the resources available to them, should have an extra-leverage or clout in performing their functions. This is especially so in enacting the role as business manager, external representative and political leader. The role of mediator may also be facilitated by the resources available to the presidency of a large country to engineer trade offs or in cajoling reluctant governments.

On the other hand, there are socially constructed factors, such as persuasive ideas, expertise, diplomatic skills, past experience with EU presidencies, foreign policy orientation and political credibility of the presidency in office. Although several schools of constructivism exist, they conceptualise member states’ interaction in the EU as framed by non-material elements, which also implies that member states’ influence does not rest on purely power-based factors such as size, or economic or political weight. 





This article has conducted a structured comparison of the Italian and Irish presidencies, explaining when, how and why they performed differently. Overall,  the Irish presidency scored better than the Italian one, even though perceptions were important, albeit in different ways. While Ireland built its Presidency on a solid foundation of goodwill accumulated from the past, the Italian Presidency developed against a background of less sympathetic assumptions. 

Two main caveats are however in order: the first being that the empirical findings may have been influenced by the specific presidencies being compared. The so-called ‘Berlusconi factor’ might be conducive to an exaggeration of the role played by intangible elements such as political credibility, diplomatic skills, and expertise in EU affairs. Be that as it may, the analytical framework proposed locates such an explanation in theoretical terrain. Furthermore, the analytical framework of this research is applicable to other member states, individually, bilaterally and multilaterally – and this therefore leaves open the possibility for further research. 
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^1	  See the Journal of Common Market Studies Annual Review, Notre Europe presidency reports, Centre for European Policy Studies briefing notes etc.
^2	  Svensson (2000) compares the role of four presidencies in negotiating the Amsterdam treaty 1995-7.
^3	  The conclusion of the Seville European Council in 2002 established a multi-annual strategic programme for the three years and in the light of such programme, an annual operating programme of Council activities proposed jointly by the next two Presidencies see http://ue.eu.int/pressData/en/ec/71212.pdf. The objective of these reforms was to strengthen the coherence of the work of the Council and to ensure continuity from one presidency to another (Laffan 2003).
^4	  The Programme of the Italian presidency can be found at http://www.ueitalia2003.it/NR/rdonlyres/57F9D4ED-4498-47F5-A4ED-73FE0BF965AC/0/ProgrammaPresidenza_ING.pdf accessed on 15 September 2003 at 8pm.
^5	  The programme of the Irish presidency can be found at http://www.eu2004.ie/templates/standard.asp?sNavlocator=5,11,153 accessed on 30 April 2004 at 5pm
^6	  The Constitutional treaty drafted by the European Convention is CON 850/03, available at http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/03/cv00/cv00850en03.pdf. 
^7	  The website of the Italian presidency is http://www.ueitalia2003.it/ITA. Information and documents concerning the IGC can be found there.
^8	  For a very negative assessment of Berlusconi's management of this meeting, however, see Ludlow (2003).
^9	  In approaching the final summit Berlusconi was on the record as saying that he had a formula up his sleeve that could work (Financial Times, 11 December 2003). After the lacklustre European Council, Berlusconi’s statement that ‘Italy is coming away with excellent results: the EU Food Agency will be located in Parma’ (Financial Times, 15 December 2003) was also out of touch with reality.
^10	  At a more superficial, but nonetheless significant level, the annual bonhomie generated by St Patrick’s Day at the White House reflects close personal links between Irish political leaders and their American counterparts.
^11	  The conduct of the Italian chairmanship at the ECOFIN meeting in which the suspension of the Pact was discussed was criticized as less than impartial by some of the smaller member states. The case was subsequently brought by the Commission before the European Court of Justice. 
^12	  The smooth completion of the accession process and the  warm welcomes provided by Ireland to the new ten accession states also helped to dispel the criticism that Irish opinion  was against EU enlargement.
^13	  On the constructivist-rationalist divide in EU studies see Checkel (2001, 1999), and Moravcsik (2001, 1999).
